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ABSTRACT
Ionospheric Neutron Content Analyzer (INCA), a student led CubeSat project at New Mexico State University
(NMSU). INCA is launching on NASA’s ELaNa 20 mission carrying a neutron detector designed and built by
NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center. The INCA mission is the first spacecraft built by New Mexico State
University in many years, as such, the program was essentially started from scratch with minimal pre-existing
resources. While eventually successful, INCA took many missteps along the way, starting out as a 6U, eventually
being completely redesigned to a 3U, before launching after around six years of development. This paper documents
INCA’s design, build, and early operations, along the way the team learned many lessons about designing and
building a small satellite in the context of a university program. This paper is targeted at new university teams
considering starting a mission, documenting best practices learned by the INCA team, and some pitfalls to avoid.
where NMSU built the spacecraft, and Goddard
provided the science instrument.

INTRODUCTION
The Ionospheric Neutron Content Analyzer (INCA) is a
3U student mission led by New Mexico State
University (NMSU). While this is not the first SmallSat
built by NMSU, the previous efforts occurred several
years prior to the INCA mission, with everyone
including the faculty who worked on previous missions
have left NMSU. As such the INCA mission is being
conducted by an all-new team which had essentially no
prior experience with SmallSats.

INCA MISSION
Science Mission

Figure 1: INCA undergoing final testing

Figure 2: Interior of the Neutron Detector including
the mount for the two scintillators

This paper is intended to document the mistakes and
lessons learned by the INCA team with the hope that
future missions will be able to learn from NMSU’s
mistakes. While the INCA mission has had significant
challenges, the mission is now essentially complete and
is manifested on the upcoming ELaNa 20 launch. The
INCA mission is a partnership with NASA Goddard,
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The INCA CubeSat is flying a Silicon Photomultiplier
(SiPM) based Neutron Detector. This Neutron detector
will for the first time measure the time and latitude
dependence of the Neutron Spectrum in Low Earth
Orbit (LEO). The Neutron detector, which was built by
NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, and is based
around two cylindrical P-Terphenyl Scintillators. These
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scintillators generate photons when hit by energetic
particles such as neutrons. The photons are then read
out by an array of SiPMs, which convert the them into
an electronic signal. The two main scintillators are
enclosed in a box of veto panels, which only react to
charged particles and not neutral particles, therefore
making it possible to reject charged particles. This is
necessary, as the main detector cannot distinguish
between charged and neutral particles. The Neutron
detector determines the energy of a particle by
measuring the time of flight between when a neutron
strikes each of the two scintillators.

Additionally, the system included side panels that cover
the first 1U of the 3U structure. These panels contain 3axis open core magnetorquers. The INCA team
purchased a GPS, which integrates into the COTS flight
computer and the included antenna on the -Z panel.
Sensors integrated with the commercial system include
sun sensors, temperature sensors, and magnetometers
on the outer panels. The rest of the hardware consists of
a BeagleBone Black and a Globalstar radio. The rest of
the components were custom manufactured by the
INCA team and not COTS parts.
Thermal analysis showed that some of the materials in
the neutron detector would get too hot and lose their
useful properties, so a copper heat sink with a mylar
sheet facing the front of the satellite was included
between the sun sensor on the front face and the front
of the detector. NMSU made a custom PCB to mount
the BeagleBone Black and Globalstar radio to the
structure. Additionally, this board contained the
circuitry required to connecting the detector to the
BeagleBone and the flight computer. Providing power
to the satellite, are a set of custom deployable and side
solar panels. These panels included temperature sensors
for a better understanding of the spacecrafts thermal
state, and the circuitry for the deployment mechanism.
Due to the accuracy required to achieve some of the
mission objectives, a custom directionally sensitive sun
sensor was required on the front face to accurately
determine the attitude of the satellite with respect to the
sun, as such a custom sensor was designed and
fabricated to achieve this sensitivity.

INCA’s science objective is to measure the neutron flux
in LEO, which feeds into models of the formation of
Earth’s
magnetic
field.
Additionally,
these
measurements contribute to understanding the radiation
environment that satellites encounter, and to the
understanding of neutron air showers, which pose a
radiation hazard to occupants of high-altitude aircraft
such as airliners.
Software Design
INCA utilizes a multi-processor architecture, with the
main system board being controlled by a low-power
ARM processor, and the neutron detector controlled by
a BeagleBone Black. This architecture allows the
payload to communicate with the BeagleBone Black
via a USB network protocol, utilizing the processing
power of the high-power consumption BeagleBone
Black only during science collection. Off-board INCA,
the ground station computer is used to communicate
with the satellite. The communication between these
computers is a master-minion tree, where the ground
station computer is the master of the system board on
the satellite. Onboard the satellite, the system board is
the master of the BeagleBone Black. The master
controls the communication link, with the minion only
responding when requested by the master. This is
critical for the half-duplex communication link between
the ground and the satellite in order to ensure
commands can always be sent to the satellite.
The main-system board software uses a single
executable structure to reduce complexities of interprocess communication. This is effective in reducing
complexity but increases the risk of changing onboard
software during flight, as the entire flight code must be
re-uploaded to perform this procedure.
Hardware Design

Figure 3: INCA with the solar panels deployed

The hardware for INCA is based on an off the shelf
CubeSat system, which includes a 3U hard anodized
aluminum structure, flight computer, battery, and a -Z
panel with integrated antennas for a GPS and radio.
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INCA DEVELOPMENT CYCLE

the spacecraft would fit together. The external
components were fabricated first because the design of
these would not be altered by any changes in the design
of the detector. These external components included the
front sun sensor, the deployable solar panels, and the
side panels for the 2U of the structure not covered by
the COTS side panels.

UNP days
The INCA mission started as a 6U CubeSat in 2012 as
part of the University Nanosat Program (UNP) in their
NS-8 competition. INCA remained in the UNP program
until the end of phase A, at which point the UNP
program down selected from ten missions to five.
INCA was down selected from the UNP program,
primarily due to lack of design maturity at the time. The
UNP project provided the INCA team with a strong
foundation in developing the initial mission.

The detector took multiple iterations to finalize the
design; though the external dimensions did not vary too
greatly between iterations because the team had already
identified how much space the rest of the avionics stack
would take. Once the detector design was finalized, the
structural parts were manufactured at NMSU in the oncampus machine shop. The completed detector
structural components were then sent to NASA
Goddard where the rest of the components were
assembled into the detector structure. Upon receiving
the completed detector at NMSU, a test fit into the
spacecraft structure revealed that the detector was 0.5
mm too large in every dimension, which prevented the
spacecraft from being assembled around the detector.
The detector was too big as a result to the thickness of a
Teflon wrap around the veto panels, which were not
properly accounted for in the detector design. To deal
with this issue, the detector was sent back to Goddard
for modification. This is a good example of why
prototypes of all components should be made as early
as possible to prevent these issues from occurring at the
last minute. Once the detector was integrated into the
structure and the final position and dimensions
determined, the custom board to mount the BeagleBone
Black and the Globalstar radio were designed. This
board needed to include a hole to clear part of the
wiring harness for the detector. The CAD model was
used to figure out the final position the BeagleBone
would be mounted in and the mounting PCBs were
ordered. After fully assembling one of these boards and
installing it into the structure, everything appeared to fit
correctly until the coax connector was installed on the
radio. The connector stuck out roughly 8 mm beyond
the side of the radio and was found to interfere with the
side panel, which would have resulted in the external
dimensions exceeding the size of the deployment
canister. A redesign of the board was required which
shifted the Beagleone and radio over enough to allow
for the length of the stack from one side of the
BeagleBone to the coax connector on the other side to
fit within the side panels. Even with this change, a USB
connector that would not be used on the BeagleBone
had to be removed because it protruded too far past the
edge of the board and the end of the coax connector had
to be filed down to avoid contacting the side panel.

Converting to 3U
As the mission was fundamentally sound, merely
behind schedule, and much of the UNP funding was
still available, it was decided to continue development,
even after the INCA mission was down selected from
the UNP process. However, without the UNP programs
support, obtaining a launch became significantly more
challenging. It was quickly identified that launch
opportunities for 6U’s where few and far between.
After careful analysis of INCA’s design, it was
determined by sacrificing a small amount of resolution
in the neutron detector, it would be possible to shorten
the detector, and shrink INCA into a 3U CubeSat. This
decision substantially opened up launch opportunities,
and eventually resulted in a launch slot through
NASA’s CubeSat Launch Initiative (CSLI).
Launch Selection
Due to a low budget once INCA lost continued UNP
funding, it was necessary to find a low-cost launch
option. As such, INCA applied to NASA’s CSLI
program. This competitive program launches CubeSat
payloads from any US educational institution with a no
transfer of funds agreement. The INCA program
proposed to the CSLI program for the first time in
November 2014, as a 6U CubeSat. This proposal was
not selected, so the INCA team converted the mission
into a 3U and reapplied in November 2015. In February
2016 the INCA team was notified that it had been
selected for the CSLI program and a few weeks later it
was announced that INCA was manifested for launch
on the ELaNa 20 mission onboard Virgin Galactic’s
LauncherOne. This was a unique launch opportunity in
that there was no primary payload, and the only other
payloads where other ELaNa CubeSats.
3U Development
The COTS CubeSat system purchased by the INCA
team included most of the major systems. These
components fit together relatively well with minimal
modifications. A CAD model of the satellite with all of
the components included was used to determine how
Rankin

A challenge the INCA team faced was a poor decision
made early on to try to make a UNP deadline, this
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resulted in hardware being selected that was not
designed for the purpose. A system suite was selected,
that was designed for a 1U satellite, and the INCA team
added various boards to the encompassing suite to make
it work with the additional solar panels, and the neutron
detector. This solution worked but resulted in undesired
issues. One of the issues required completely replacing
the COTS interface board with a custom board to
permit integration between CubeSat kit, and the rest of
the system. This board design was complex and would
not have been needed with better early system
engineering.

generally unfamiliar with how to use the systems until
late in the testing process, significantly slowing final
development. To fix these, the recommended solution is
to develop a series of simple tests, to be completed
early on. These are steps like demonstrating power on,
demonstrating two components can communicate with
each other, or charging a battery. The important part is
that these tests are measurable and can be performed
progressively throughout the development cycle. These
tests should be done with both prototype, and flight
hardware.

LESSONS LEARNED

The biggest challenges encountered on the INCA
project was the high turnover rate of undergraduate
students. The INCA mission took over six years
between inception, and launch. With the exception of
the faculty PI, no one involved with the beginning of
the project is currently involved. The long timeframes
involved relative to the duration of a single student
involvement necessitates that any university CubeSat
project have a well-defined recruitment plan. The
strategy the INCA team eventually came up with is to
establish a team lead, and a co-team lead for each sub
system. The co-team lead should be at least a year
behind the team lead, so as to take over once the team
lead graduates.

Personnel

Program Management
The INCA mission learned a great deal of tips and
tricks to improve the mission programmatically. The
first major issue encountered was schedule delays. The
mission ran significantly behind for most of the design
and manufacturing process. Some of this was due to
issues beyond the team’s control, such as the teams
initial funding being delayed for several months due to
an extended government shutdown. However, most of
the delay was due to inadequate internal programmatic
designs. One of the biggest problems encountered by
the INCA team was an underestimate of how long these
projects would take. When working to a deadline that is
years away, it is very difficult to apply the appropriate
pressure on students to make progress on systems,
particularly when they also have class work. One of the
techniques that the INCA team found worked well was
to create intermediate deadlines with real penalties if
they were not met. What the INCA team recommends is
creating a regular review schedule, with reviews at least
twice a year. These reviews should have clearly defined
expectations of where the systems should be at that
point. This provides team members with clear and
imminent deadlines along with the consequence of
having to present to reviewers why they are not on
schedule.

It is important to regularly recruit new students so as to
ensure that there is always a pool of students to pull
from as people graduate off the team. The INCA team
found that the best recruiting method was to target
students at approximately the sophomore or second
semester freshmen level, this gave the team time for
older students to train these students before they
graduated. Additionally, it was found to be crucial to
recruit the students before they became involved with
other projects. It is also important to not overlook the
value of graduate students, particularly if it can be
arranged for the SmallSat project to be part of their
graduate research. What the INCA team found is that in
several important areas, namely communication
systems, attitude determination and control, vibration
analysis embedded systems, and thermal analysis.
Undergraduates don’t learn what they need to know to
perform the work in these fields until the very end of
their program. As such, the INCA team repeatedly
found that students would learn enough to start these
analyses in their final semesters and would not leave
them with sufficient time to complete the work before
they left. In order to perform analysis in these area’s it
is recommended to either have graduate students
available to perform the work, or to arrange for an
expert like a professor to be available to guide lower
level undergraduates through these tasks. If all else
fails, it is useful to arrange for funds to be available to

Another important aspect of program management that
the INCA team recommends, is too create a series of
tests which sub teams are expected to perform on a
specific schedule. On the INCA mission, the test
program was developed around doing the final system
level tests once the mission was nearly complete and
the systems where all integrated. This resulted in
problems with individual systems not being identified
until very late in the design process. This included
determining that the team needed to re-spin a couple of
custom electronic boards after they had already been
integrated. The second problem this caused is that the
team didn’t do much work with the flight hardware
until the system tests. This resulted in the team being
Rankin
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hire an outside consultant to aid with these crucial
tasks. This was not done on the INCA project, but
probably should have been.

where extremely well documented, and included
excellent customer support. INCA did purchase one
major component from a company with a very good
sales department. However, once the component was
purchased, the company failed to provide useful
documentation, or the required software libraries. This
company then proceeded to provide poor support for
their product for a few years until they finally told the
INCA team that the support contract had expired. At
this point the manufacture had still failed to provide all
of the software that was supposed to be part of the
original product. It was later discovered that this was a
common problem with this particular manufacturer.
The moral of this story is that like most industries, the
SmallSat community has many suppliers who are very
good; there are also several that are not; use caution
when choosing who to work with.

One final aspect to personnel that NMSU found very
important to recruiting useful students was to pay them.
It is not necessarily crucial to pay all of the students,
however the INCA team found that volunteer students
usually had to get a job in order to pay for school,
which significantly impacted the hours they could put
into INCA. The simple fact of the matter is that the
amount of time that is required to be put into
developing a SmallSat is more than most students can
put in while also working and attending school full
time.
Software
The largest pitfall for INCA’s software development
was manpower. As INCA is a student project, most of
the workers were volunteers with only a few paid
research assistants. This led to a shortage of workers at
times and caused the main flight software team to
merge with the Communication sub-team. Although
these teams needed to work closely to get the
communication software to work with the rest of the
satellite flight software, this decision put strain on the
small workforce of one to three students working on the
software at the time. Additionally, the software
developers wound up spending precious man-hours on
the design, of an interface board. Future missions
should ensure there is adequate manpower being
devoted to both hardware design and software design.

WORKING WITH A PARTNER
Since NASA Goddard developed the payload for the
INCA mission, the INCA team was able to experience
both the challenges and the rewards of working with a
partner on a space mission. The layout of the INCA
partnership was that Goddard developed and supplied
the instrument, which was then delivered to NMSU to
integrate into the spacecraft. This arrangement worked
well, with Goddard providing an instrument that NMSU
could never have developed by itself. However, there
were several mistakes made in this partnership. Such as
it was never clearly delineated what parts where
Goddard’s responsibility, and which parts where
NMSU’s. This resulted in a few problems, one example
was that late in the process, it was discovered that both
groups had believed that the cable, which connected the
neutron detector to the spacecraft bus, was being built
and had been purchased by the other group. This cable
included a high cost long lead-time connector which
nearly resulted in INCA missing its vibe test.
Fortunately, Goddard found a connector that had been
purchased as a spare for another mission.

COMMERCIAL OFF THE SHELF
INCA was developed with predominantly Commercial
Off the Shelf (COTS) components. This was a sound
decision for an inexperienced spacecraft team.
However, the team did learn several important lessons
about working with these types of components which
should be considered. The first is that SmallSat COTS
parts are not off the shelf in the sense that consumer
electronics are off the shelf. SmallSat COTS parts are
produced in small lots, and they should be tested nearly
as rigorously as with custom components. However, the
difference is that COTS parts will tend to pass their
testing on the first attempt, something that is often not
the case with custom components.

A second but closely related problem in the
development was the lack of a clear Interface Control
Document (ICD) between the detector and the
spacecraft bus. The INCA team strongly recommends
creating and maintaining an ICD with the partner. This
document needs to clearly define the mechanical
connection between systems, including both the
structural connection and electrical connections.
Additionally, the ICD needs to contain protocol
information about how the software communicates. The
INCA team did not have this document, and it resulted
in a significant delay in the design as each time anyone
wanted to work on those parts, it become necessary to
schedule a meeting to determine the interface. This
process also resulted in a good deal of redesign, as

A second major recommendation the INCA team has
for working with COTS components is to thoroughly
vet the manufactures before purchasing components
from them. When you develop a spacecraft, your
component manufactures essentially become a partner
on the mission and needs to act as such. The INCA
team found several manufactures that were excellent to
work with, producing high quality components that
Rankin

5

33rd Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

without a clear document more than once the two teams
misunderstood the other, and the two groups designed
conflicting parts. One particularly notable incident
involved Goddard placing a wiring harness on the
outside of the neutron detector which occupied the
same location as one of INCA’s avionics boards. This
necessitated a redesign of the avionics board with a
hole in the middle to accommodate the neutron
detectors wiring harness.

documented processes early, keep them updated and
follow them.

One final comment on partnerships, is to ensure that
both parties understand the others financial situation.
Goddard built INCA’s Neutron Detector as a spare time
project with parts scavenged from other projects. In the
end this worked out, but required NMSU to purchase
parts, and to manufacture the neutron detectors
structure. This arrangement worked but could have
turned into a significant problem if both sides had not
understood the arrangement. Overall the key to working
with Goddard successfully boiled down to
communication. It helped significantly to have a couple
of in person meetings between the two teams which
helped establish a rapport to enable future
communications to go more smoothly. However, the
most important element which significantly improved
the two teams progress was the establishment of a
weekly meeting between the key people on both teams.
This meeting includes the engineers and scientists
doing the work, and not just management.

Figure 4: The Completed INCA CubeSat

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the INCA mission has been very
successful with over one hundred students working on
it over its six-year design life. There have been
numerous lessons learned, however they fundamentally
boil down to three main points, first test early and often,
second communication is key, and third create well
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